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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH# : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920592-CA 
v. : 
BENJAMIN CECALA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1990), and theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. Did defendant preserve for appeal his claim that 
evidence he gave a false name to the arresting officer was 
irrelevant and thus erroneously admitted? 
"Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires %a clear and 
definite objection' at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for 
appeal." State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). To preserve a particular objection 
to evidence for appeal, a defendant must have specifically stated 
to the trial court the same grounds for objection presented on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appeal. State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984). 
B. Does defendant demonstrate that the court abused 
its discretion in admitting that evidence over his rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence, objection? 
A trial court has broad discretion to decide whether 
relevant evidence should be excluded under rule 403. See State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). A trial court does not 
commit reversible error in a 403 ruling unless it abuses its 
discretion; that is, "as a matter of law, the trial court's 
decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence 
outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond 
the limits of reasonability.ff Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). See also State v. 
O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 699 n.5 (Utah App. 1993). 
C. Does defendant demonstrate the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury verdict? 
In reviewing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, Utah 
appellate courts view the evidence and all inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378# 381 (Utah App. 1992). A jury 
verdict will only be reversed where reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime 
2 
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of which he was convicted. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(Utah 1989); Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) and 
theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990) (R. 7-9). 
Following a two-day jury trial, defendant was convicted 
as charged (R. 90-91). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and to a concurrent term 
of one to six months in the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 100-01). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of August 26, 1991, Rick Clausing 
looked out a front window of his home and observed some unusual 
activity across the street at the White residence, located at 614 
North 1400 West, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 287). Specifically, 
Clausing saw four young Hispanic men looking at a Bronco that was 
advertised for sale and parked in front of the White home (R. 
289-92). Clausing noted that defendant was taller than the other 
three young men and was dressed all in black (R. 290). Clausing 
observed "all four of [the young men] walk[] up to the house and 
3 
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knock[] on the door" (R. 292-93). When no one answered, Clausing 
watched the foursome ,fwalk[] back to the sidewalk" (R. 293). 
Clausing then observed defendant "split" from the other 
three and approach a retaining wall dividing the White home from 
some nearby apartments, where defendant stood facing east, 
towards the Clausing home (R. 293). The other three individuals 
jumped a fence to gain access to the back of the White home (R. 
293, 297, 308) . Clausing became "suspicious" of this activity, 
believing that defendant was acting as a "watch" for the other 
three, and asked his wife to call the police while he continued 
to observe (R. 296). Clausing noted that defendant kept looking 
back at one of the young men who had jumped the fence, but who 
had not disappeared behind the White residence with the other two 
individuals (R. 296-99). Clausing believed that defendant was 
"communicating back and forth" with this young man (R. 296, 310). 
What I saw was [defendant] standing at the 
retaining wall. The other three went around, 
[sic] jumped the fence. As they were there, 
the [defendant] kept going like this 
(indicating) back. . . . [Defendant was] 
turning his head back toward the other 
three [.] 
• • • 
Other than [defendant] turning and talking to 
the youth on the other side of the fence, 
that's all I could see. 
(R. 296-97, 299) . 
Clausing continued to observe defendant for 
approximately ten minutes until the police arrived (R. 300). 
Clausing noted that when defendant saw the police "he immediately 
4 
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was on the move" and headed for the apartments next door to the 
White home (R. 303, 307). Defendant "pretended like he lived 
there. He went to each individual [apartment] and tried to get 
in. And then he slowly, normally, like nothing happened, walked 
up, up [sic] 1400 West towards the park" (R. 300, 302). 
Officers Hallock and Bankhead from the Salt Lake City 
Police Department investigated the Clausings' report of a 
possible residential burglary at 615 North 1400 West, involving 
four Hispanic male juveniles (R. 311, 327). Upon approaching the 
White residence, the officers noted that defendant was dressed in 
black and "peeking in and out of the corner" of the nearby 
apartments (R. 314-15, 330) . Officer Bankhead observed that 
defendant appeared to be "scanning back and forth from the north 
to the south, looking for something" (R. 330) . He further 
observed that upon spotting the officers, "[defendant went] back 
from the corner so [they] couldn't [sic] have visual" (R. 331). 
Officer Hallock similarly noted that "as we pulled up, 
[defendant] walked out around the corner and started walking 
through, [sic] between the two apartment complexes there" (R. 
315) . 
As the officers got closer, Officer Bankhead heard a 
"[a] howl or a coo, an owl sound," coming from the same corner of 
the apartment and noted that defendant was "periodically kind of 
going back and looking back, or going back behind the building 
and peeking out again" (R. 331). The next thing Officer Bankhead 
saw was three male Hispanic juveniles "com[ing] out from a row of 
5 
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bushes that [separated] the apartments and the house" (R. 332). 
Officer Hallock said, "Police, stop," and pursued the fleeing 
suspects (R. 316) . Officer Bankhead stayed behind to secure the 
scene (R. 317, 334). 
Upon returning to the White residence, Officer Bankhead 
observed defendant "knocking" on the apartment doors (R. 335, 
342). While talking with Rick Clausing, Officer Bankhead watched 
as defendant "started to walk northbound on Fourteenth West" (R. 
336). Officer Bankhead called for backup and pursued defendant 
into nearby Riverside Park (R. 336, 354). Defendant was 
subsequently arrested in the park by Officer Evans, who had 
responded to Officer Bankhead's request for backup (R. 354). At 
the time of his arrest, defendant falsely gave his name as 
Salvador Sanchez (R. 356). He also denied knowing the others 
involved in the burglary and theft (R. 358). Instead, defendant 
claimed he was in the park "looking to talk to girls" (R. 358). 
At trial, defendant moved to exclude evidence that he 
gave a false name to the arresting officer on the ground that it 
was unfairly prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(R. 345). The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding 
that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its 
prejudicial effect (R. 348). Additionally, the court found the 
evidence relevant to defendant's credibility (R. 349) (the 
parties arguments and the trial court's ruling are reproduced in 
the Addendum) . 
6 
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Johnny Torres, who pled guilty to burglarizing the 
White residence, was the sole witness called to testify on 
defendant's behalf (R. 363). According to Torres, he approached 
the front door of the White residence alone, while the others 
hung back (R. 365, 378) . Torres asserted defendant was genuinely 
interested in purchasing the Bronco and remained at the sidewalk 
"looking at the price and writing down the phone number" (R. 
378). Torres further claimed the burglary and theft were his 
idea and that defendant declined to participate, stating that he 
wanted "no part of it" (R. 365) . Finally, Torres denied that 
defendant acted as a "lookout" during the burglary and theft (R. 
380-82). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not preserve for appeal his relevancy 
challenge to the trial court's admission of evidence that 
defendant gave the arresting officer a false name. Furthermore, 
he fails to show that the court abused its discretion in refusing 
to exclude that evidence under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
As for defendant's apparent challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, the Court should not even consider 
it because defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict. Even if the Court were to 
consider the merits of defendant's claim, there was ample 
evidence before the jury to sustain defendant's conviction. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED FOR REVIEW HIS 
RELEVANCY CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S 
EVIDENTIARY RULING, NOR HAS HE DEMONSTRATED 
THE RULING WAS OTHERWISE UNFAIRLY 
PREJUDICIAL; ADDITIONALLY, DEFENDANT HAS NOT 
DEMONSTRATED THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT 
Defendant claims the trial court erroneously admitted 
evidence that he gave the arresting officer a false name. 
Defendant claims the evidence was "irrelevant to determining [his 
intention] at the time of the [offense]" (Br. of App. at 11). 
Thus, defendant broadly concludes the evidence was unfairly 
prejudicial under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, and should 
have been excluded (Br. of App. at 12). Insofar as it has been 
preserved for review, defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
evidentiary ruling lacks merit. 
A. Waiver Standard 
"Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires 'a clear and 
definite objection' at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for 
appeal." State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). To preserve a particular objection 
to evidence for appeal, a defendant must have specifically stated 
to the trial court the same grounds for objection presented on 
appeal. State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984). Cf. State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991) ("Generally, a defendant who 
fails to bring an issue before the trial court is barred from 
8 
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asserting it initially on appeal,"). As recently observed by 
this Court, the 
specificity requirement arises out of the 
trial court's need to assess allegations by 
isolating relevant facts and considering them 
in the context of the specific legal doctrine 
placed at issue. For this reason, a general 
objection may be insufficient to preserve a 
specific substantive issue for appeal. 
State v. Brown, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40 (Utah App. 1993). 
1. Proceedings Below 
In moving to exclude evidence that he gave the 
arresting officer a false name, defendant's only articulated 
argument below was his general assertion that the evidence was 
unfairly prejudicial under rule 403: 
. . . [J]ust so the record's [sic] clear, I 
think the prejudice we have is the fact that 
a person charged with a crime[,] and is on 
trial[,] is shown to have lied to the police 
officers. And [sic] I think that is 
prejudicial. I mean[,] the court may not 
think it's overwhelming[ly] prejudicial, but 
I do think some prejudice results from the 
jury hearing that he lied to a police 
officer. 
(R. 349) (see Addendum). Defendant raised no challenge to the 
State's responsive argument that the evidence was admissible to 
show defendant's intent, participation in, and knowledge1 of the 
charged offenses (R. 346-47) (see Addendum). 
The trial court admitted the evidence, finding that its 
probative value outweighed the danger of any unfair prejudice, 
1
 See Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides 
for the admission of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" to show 
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
9 
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and that it was "highly relevant" to defendant's credibility (R. 
348-49) (see Addendum). 
2. Failure to Preserve Relevancy Argument 
For the first time on appeal, defendant appears to 
assert that evidence of his lie was erroneously admitted below 
because it is irrelevant to the intent element of the offenses 
charged (Br. of App. at 11-12). However, because defendant 
limited his argument below to the potential for rule 403 
prejudice and did not make a relevancy2 objection to the 
evidence below, the issue has not been properly preserved for 
review. See State v. Larsen. 828 P.2d 487, 495 (Utah App.) 
(general allegation of prejudice below held insufficient to 
preserve appellate argument that evidence should have been 
excluded as impermissible character evidence under rule 4 04, Utah 
Rules of Evidence), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). See 
also Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 34-35; Van Matre. 777 P.2d at 462; 
Davis, 689 P.2d at 14. The record does not indicate any reason 
for defendant's failure to so challenge the evidence in the trial 
court. Cf. State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 
1992) (absent special justification for failing to present all 
available grounds in support of a suppression motion, this Court 
will not rule on those grounds not addressed in the trial court). 
2
 See Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, which defines 
M[r]elevant evidence" as that "evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." 
10 
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Moreover, defendant has not argued that there are "exceptional 
circumstances" justifying his waiver of the issue, or that this 
Court should consider his argument under the plain error 
doctrine. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d at 35; Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 925. 
Accordingly, the Court should deem defendant's objection to the 
relevancy of the evidence waived. 
B. Failure to Demonstrate Unfair Prejudice 
Further, defendant fails to show that the trial court 
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence over his rule 403 
objection. A trial court has broad discretion to decide whether 
relevant evidence should be excluded under rule 403. See State 
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992); State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). A trial court does not 
commit reversible error in a 403 ruling unless it abuses its 
discretion; that is, "as a matter of law, the trial court's 
decision that %the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence 
outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond 
the limits of reasonability." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). See also State v. 
O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 699 n.5 (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant's only allegation of unfair prejudice on 
appeal rests on his assumption that the evidence was not properly 
admissible to demonstrate his intent, participation and/or 
knowledge. See Br. of App. at 12. However, as noted previously, 
defendant failed to challenge the State's argument on these 
precise grounds below. For the same reasons defendant cannot 
11 
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raise a relevancy argument for the first time on appeal, he 
cannot extrapolate from the unpreserved argument to support his 
allegation of rule 403 prejudice. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 34-35; 
Van Matre, 777 P.2d at 462; Davis, 689 P.2d at 14. Moreover, as 
further noted, rule 404(b) expressly provides for the admission 
of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" to demonstrate "intent" and 
"knowledge," two of the precise grounds articulated by the State 
to support admission of the evidence below. See State v. Taylor, 
818 P.2d 561, 571 (Utah App. 1991) (where prejudicial evidence is 
at least equally probative of a critical fact, it is properly 
admissible under rules 404 and 403). 
Finally, defendant's reliance on State v. Bolsinaer, 
699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), is misplaced. In Bolsinaer, the Utah 
Supreme Court determined the evidence was insufficient to 
"support a finding of depravity in the conduct of [Bolsinger] 
that caused the death of [the victim]." 699 P.2d at 1220-21. In 
so ruling, the court noted that in erroneously finding depravity, 
"[t]he jury may well have been swayed" by Bolsinger's 
"reprehensible conduct" following the homicide. Id. at 1221. 
Accordingly, the court clarified that at the moment of the 
victim's death, "the conduct which subjected [Bolsinger] to a 
charge of criminal homicide came to an end." Id. Thus, 
Bolsinaer deals with what evidence may properly be considered 
part of the actus reus for depraved murder. It says nothing, 
however, about the potential relevancy, admissibility or 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prejudicial effect of post-offense conduct under the rules of 
evidence. 
Rather, State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), is 
controlling on this point. In Garcia, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the admission of Garcia's threat to kill a passerby at the 
time of his arrest for murder. Applying the predecessor to rule 
403 (former rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence), the court 
determined the probative value of the evidence outweighed any 
"potential for prejudice" on the ground the threat 
"'constituted] circumstantial evidence of consciousness of 
guilt.'" 663 P.2d at 65 (quoting McCormick's Handbook of the Law 
of Evidence § 271 (2d ed. 1972)). Accord State v. Allen, 787 
P.2d 566, 571 (Wash. App. 1990) (giving a false name and 
identification to arresting officer suggests guilty knowledge, 
inconsistent with defendant's denial of wrongdoing; thus, 
evidence was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial); Callis v. 
People, 692 P.2d 1045, 1050 (Colo. 1984) (an accused's use of a 
false name to an arresting officer is probative of an intent to 
avoid detection or apprehension and is thus admissible as 
evidence of guilty knowledge or as probative of some issue 
relating to identification). There is no distinguishing Garcia 
from the instant facts. Defendant's lie bore directly on his 
guilty knowledge of the charged offenses; thus, the evidence was 
relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's cursory analysis on 
appeal simply fails to demonstrate that the trial court acted 
13 
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unreasonably in admitting the evidence over his rule 403 
objection. 
C. Failure to Demonstrate Insufficiency of 
the Evidence 
Finally, insofar as defendant appears to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict (Br. of 
App. at 12-14), his argument should be rejected for failure to 
comply with the marshaling requirements of State v. Moore, 802 
P.2d 732, 783 (Utah App. 1990). 
The power of this Court to review a jury verdict 
challenged on sufficiency of evidence is "quite limited." Id. 
As this Court has recognized, "[i]n challenging the sufficiency 
of the evidence, the burden on the defendant is heavy. Defendant 
must 'marshal all evidence supporting the jury's verdict and must 
then show how this marshaled evidence is insufficient to support 
the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.'" State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citations omitted). 
Defendant has failed to meet this purposefully heavy 
burden. Rather than marshaling all the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and then demonstrating how the marshaled evidence 
is insufficient, defendant has blended the evidence supporting 
the verdict with that which he believes conflicts with the 
verdict. In essence, defendant merely reargues the relative 
merits of the testimony presented to the jury. However, this 
Court does not sit as a jury, and defendant's attempt to reargue 
the evidence presented at trial is therefore not a proper method 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, 
the Court should refuse to consider defendant's insufficiency of 
evidence claim based on defendant's failure to properly marshal 
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 
Even if this Court were to consider defendant's 
apparent sufficiency challenge, there was ample evidence to 
support defendant's conviction. Rather than recount the evidence 
supporting defendant's conviction, the State refers the Court to 
the Statement of the Facts at pp. 2-6, supra. Viewed in its 
proper light on appeal, the evidence presented at trial provides 
substantial support for the jury's verdict. This Court should 
therefore reject defendant's sufficiency challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, defendant's 
convictions for burglary and theft should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this<j?£>day of July, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
assistant Attorney General 
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(Side bar conference out of the hearing of the 
jury,) 
THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, 
we're going to take a very brief afternoon recess to allow 
you to get something to drink, use the restrooms, make 
phone calls, or stretch your legs. We'll be in recess for 
ten minutes, and I'll ask you to come back to the jury 
room, to try to stay on this floor if you can. Let the 
bailiff know where you're going to be if you're going to be 
off the floor. 
Do not discuss the case, do not allow anyone to 
discuss it with you or in your presence, do not form an 
opinion, continue to keep an open mind. If anyone attempts 
to discuss the case with you, report it to the bailiff or 
to me directly. And with that in mind, we'll be in recess 
for ten minutes. Thank you. 
(The jury left the courtroom.) 
THE COURT: All right, let the record reflect 
that counsel and the defendant are present, and the jury 
has been excused. 
Mr. McCaughey, there was a side bar conference 
prior to my excusing the jury, and it's my understanding 
that in response to the indication I gave you at a side bar 
conference you indicated that while you were pleased with 
the victory you've achieved, or the semi-victory, you 
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wanted to put this on the record, and certainly you have 
the opportunity to do so. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Your Honor, my understanding is 
the prosecution is going to call a vitness who would 
testify that Mr. Cecala, when apprehended, gave a false 
name, a name that was not his. 
I have previously mentioned to the court before 
we started this trial that I had a motion in limine which I 
wanted the court to hear. The basis of that motion in 
limine, to exclude any reference to a false name given by 
Mr. Cecala, and the basis of that was that it's, any 
probative value that that evidence had, or has, is far 
outweighed by the prejudiciality that would be shown to the 
defendant. 
My understanding is that the court is going to 
deny that motion, at least as far as the initial false name 
that Mr. Cecala gave, but is going to sustain the motion as 
to any other false names. My position is that the court 
should keep everything out, because I think it's under Rule 
403, the prejudiciality. 
THE COURT: Everything, or everything concerned 
the alleged giving of the false name? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Everything under the giving of 
the false name under Rule 403. 
THE COURT: Let me clarify before Mr. Jones is 
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given an opportunity to respond. You brought this to my 
attention this morning in chambers. Mr. Jones was present 
as well. You did not ask for a formal hearing at that 
time. 
MR. McCAUGHEY: Right. 
THE COURT: I indicated I would allow you an 
opportunity for a full-blown hearing if you wanted it, or 
at least to put the matter on the record and I would 
consider the same in the interim; is that fair? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, your response? 
MR. JONES: Well, Judge, I just think that the 
evidence concerning the defendant giving a false name is 
certainly consistent with the element of guilt by the 
defendant. You have a situation where the officers are 
called, some of them take off and run, the defendant 
doesn't run away, but he appears to be peeking around the 
corner. He walks away from the officers. 
I just think his lying to the officer about who 
he is and his identity is certainly something that the jury 
should be able to consider in the case in trying to 
determine his role, if any, in this particular crime. 
THE COURT: So you're saying it goes to an 
assessment of his intent? 
MR. JONES: Yes, I think so. 
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THE COURT: And his participation? 
MR. JOKES: And knowledge of the crime. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, it's my understanding from 
the side bar conference that you had alluded to three false 
names that were given to law enforcement by the defendant; 
is that correct? 
MR. JONES: Well, I'm not sure all three are 
false, but originally he gives the name of Salvador 
Sanchez, and then the officers discover that's not his 
name, and when they confront him with that he then gives 
them the name of Bennie Medina, and they come back and say, 
"That's not your name,99 and he finally gives them the name 
of Benjamin Cecala. So I guess there are three changes in 
his name. 
THE COURT: There doesn't appear to be much 
question that the first name is not the defendant's correct 
name; is that right, Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: That's right. He goes by the 
second, too, because I think Medina, he uses both Medina 
and Cecala. Because his father's name is Medina but his 
mother's name is now Cecala. 
THE COURT: That appears consistent with what I 
would have ruled in any event, and now it becomes even 
clearer, and that is, Mr. Jones, I am going to allow you to 
go into the giving of a false name, to wit, the first name 
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that was given. 
I am going to ask you to direct your witnesses 
not to allude to the other names having been given by the 
defendant, or referring to him in any way as aliases or 
anything else. I don't think that that is probative. I 
think the single giving of a name that is contrary to the 
accurate name is probative. 
I think that whatever prejudicial effect it has, 
if any, is far outweighed by the probative value of the 
same. I can't see any prejudicial effect, I can see a 
clear probative value to this, and particularly I think 
we're not looking at a prejudicial effect, if it's limited 
in the manner I indicated. 
Mr. Jones, I'll ask you to clearly discuss that 
over the break with your witnesses. 
MR. JONES: All right, I will. 
THE COURT: Is there anything further, Mr. 
McCaughey? 
MR. McCAUGHEY: My only argument, just so the 
record's clear, I think the prejudice we have is the fact 
that a person charged with a crime and is on trial is shown 
to have lied to the police officers. And I think that is 
prejudicial. I mean the court may not think it's 
overwhelming prejudicial, but I do think some prejudice 
results from the jury hearing that he lied to a police 
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officer. 
THE COURT: I think your point is well taken. 
What I'm saying is the prejudicial effect, if any, is 
outweighed by the probative value. And to the extent that 
this gets to the defendant's credibility, I think it 
becomes highly relevant and probative. So you've 
articulated yet another basis for my ruling. 
But as to the other alleged aliases, they are not 
to come in. And you know, it's kind of like the old 
Groucho Marx MYou Bet Your Life11 show where the little 
birdie comes down. I don't want to hear it. If I see the 
bird coming down with the witness referring to this, I'm 
going to be mad. 
So talk to your witnesses and make it very clear 
to them just what they can say and just what they cannot 
say. Tell them if there's any doubt in their mind about 
what's appropriate and what is not, they're to stop and ask 
for an opportunity to confer with you, Mr. Jones. I don't 
want to run the risk of a mistrial at this juncture. 
MR. JONES: I might indicate, I think we only 
have one more witness. 
MR. McGAUGHEY: Is that a police officer? 
MR. JONES: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Who is the next witness? 
MR. JONES: Dean Evans. I don't anticipate he'll 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
S\ 0 % *> *-v 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
